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1. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1980 the Maternity Leave and Employment Protection Act 
was passed. The long title describes the Act as one designed to: 
prescribe minimum requirements with respect to 
maternity leave and to protect the rights of 
female employees during both pregnancy and maternity 
leave. 
The philosophy underlying the Act has been characterised 
by the New Zealand Arbitration Court as a recognition that the 
legal status of women and their everyday conditions should be 
improved, according to the trend towards social justice. 1 
Thus the Act's provisions are aimed at giving a female employee 
the right of choice to continue her employment career after an 
interruption for purposes of childbirth, early nurturing and 
to make arrangements for suitable continuing care of the child. 2 
However the Court points out that, because the provision of 
maternity leave to women employees involves some cost or change 
to the existing order, the employee's right to resume employment 
after maternity leave is not an absolute right. Her right must 
be balanced against the employer's right to manage the business 
efficiently. The degree of recognition of the female employee's 
right is therefore governed by considerations of the extent of 
disruption to the employer's business; by the amount of cost to 
the employer; and, to a lesser degree by the detriment to other 
3 employees. 
As yet, the Maternity Leave and Employment Protection Act 
has not been the subject of much judicial or academic scrutiny. 
Indeed only two judgments have dealt with some of the interpre-
tation and policy issues raised by the Act, and writers have 
mainly concentrated on a comparison of the Act with overseas 
legislation or Ind ustrial Awards. 
Therefore it will be the task of this paper to determine the 
true extent of protection accorded to a woman applying for 
maternity leave under the Act. In particular the paper will 
examine whether interpre tation, policy and operational issues 
have the effect of r e sulting in a ba lance unfavourable to the 
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pregnant employee. 
In order to achieve this, relevant provisions of the Act 
will be analysed in detail. Specifically, the Act will be 
examined against the two judicial decisions. (which will also 
be critically examined) and also current public and private 
sector awards studied by the writer. (Appendix One). The value 
of such a comparison is that it better enables the writer to 
assess the effectiveness and value of the Act, and helps deter-
mine whether in fact the Act should be retained or rather 
drafted afresh. 
ANALYSIS OF PROVISIONS OF THE ACT 
Determining Whether the Act Applies to a Particular Female 
Employee 
Section 4 determines whether the Act applies to an employee 
or not. Because the Act only sets minimum standards it applies 
only in cases where the rights and benefits provided by any 
other provision4 are in their overall effect, less favourable 
than those in the statute. 
The section raises a number of issues, which have been dealt 
with by the Arbitration Court in the case New Zealand Bank 
Officers•· Industrial Union of Workers v A.N.Z. Banking Group 
(NZ Ltd) Ltd. 5 Because this case provides guidelines as to 
interpretation in a number of sections, it is relevant to 
consider its facts and the Arbitration Court decision before 
going on to deal with the issues raised by section 4. 
In the ANZ case, the woman employee Mrs Brown, had been 
employed by the respondent bank for seven years. At the time of 
pregnancy she occupied the position of securities clerk, grade 
III at a small branch in Kaitaia, which had a staff of ten 
people. On 27 April 1982 Mrs Brown applied for maternity leave 
pursuant to clause 20 of the award. The bank accepted her 
application without requiring any medical certificate. 
On 11 June 1982 Mrs Brown received a reply from the bank 
informing her that she had been granted maternity leave but that 
it would be necessary to provide a permanent replacement for her 
and therefore her position would not be kept open, but she 
I 
3. 
would be given preference over other officers for the next nine 
months, for placement in a position similar to the one she presently 
occupied. Later the bank turned down a request by Mrs Brown that 
they reconsider the decision not to hold open her position. 
Shortly after commencing maternity leave, Mrs Brown's union 
invoked the provisions of the Act so that the proceedings came 
before a complaint committee and then the Arbitration Court. 
The Arbitration Court decided that the award rather than the 
Act applied in this case on the basis that the rights and benefits 
under the award were in their overall effect, more favourable to 
Mrs Brown than those in the Act. In particular the Court determined 
that the award provisions required the bank in this case to find a 
suitable temporary employee or a permanent staff replacement 
suitable for retransfer when, and if, Mrs Brown wished to return 
to work. The Court therefore found in Mrs Brown's favour and 
declared that she was entitled to resume work as from 9 June 1983. 
The paper will now deal with the Court's interpretation of 
the issues raised by section 4. 
The first issue is whether in reconciling a maternity provision6 
with the Act, the Court is bound to apply one to the exclusion of 
the other. The Arbitration Court held that a court is required 
under section 4 to do so. The section requires an assessment of 
the overall effect of the Act. "One package is picked in preference 
to the other package, rather than reading both documents together 
with any inconsistencies resolved by reference to a dominant 
document or by reference to the better of individual portions ·. " 7 
It is submitted that this test, if adopted, must be qualified 
in situations where a collective agreement expressly draws 
attention to the provisions of the Act or states that the 
provisions of the Act shall apply where appropriate. In such 
cases it is clear that the Act must be read in conjunction with 
the collective agreement. 8 
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The Court's approach to this section is clearly a practical 
one, as there could arise difficult and frequent issues of 
interpretation if one instrument did not apply to the exclusion 
of the other. However it is possible to interpret the statute 
as meaning that it is only in relation to a particular issue 
that the Act will not apply. This interpretation can be justified 
on the gro~nds that the section does not say that the whole of 
the Act shall not apply, merely that the Act shall not apply. 
This approach has the advantage of greater flexibility, however 
as stated before it could lead to more frequent litigation. 
The second issue is in respect of who picks the package. It was 
argued by the union in the case that it is the female employee 
who has the right to choose which package applies, because of 
the words: "to that female employee" in section 4. This 
argument was rejected by Williamson J who said there was nothing 
in the Act which "gives the individual female employee an absolute 
right of election which has effect to bind her employer to her 
choice. 119 Therefore although the employee can make the initial 
decision as to which package is preferable, if the employer 
disputes this the Court will become the ultimate authority to 
settle the difference between the parties. The Court must settle 
10 the disa~reement by comparing the two packages. In making 
the comparison, what must be considered is the "overall effect" 
as it applies to "that female employee. 1111 
The third issue is: with reference to what point of time is the comparison 
to be made? 
The Court held that the comparison must be made as at the time 
of application for leave. 12 
It was felt that if the parties have to wait until all the events 
have happened before deciding which package applies, there would 
be considerable practical inconvenience and uncertainty. 13 In 
the normal case, a pregnant employee would initially make the 
choice and then apply under either the Act or another maternity 
provision. The employer would then either accept the chosen 
package or reject it. It is at that point that any dispute 
should be settled under the available procedures. 14 
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The fourth issue deals with how the package is to be picked. 
This is perhaps the most imp@rtant and controversial aspect of 
any maternity leave case. A detailed examination of how the 
Arbitration Court determined which factors were of greatest 
significance in choosing the package applied in the case, is 
therefore relevant. 
The Union submitted that the Act was more favourable to Mrs Brown. 
In support of this they raised three points of difference 
between the award and the Act namely: 
(i) Period of leave - award nine months, Act six months. 
(ii) Period of notice of return to work - award one 
month, Act 21 days. 
(iii) A definition of "substantially similar position" -
the award provides one, 15 the Act does not. 
The Court held that the last two points, as they affected 
Mrs Brown in 1982, were trivial and so discussed them no further. 
This view is probably correct. Instead the Court raised two 
other points of difference: 
(vi) Period of preference if position not able to be 
kept open - the Act provides a period of 26 weeks. 16 
(It should be noted that the Act does not clarify 
whenthis period starts. The Court held that it 
starts at the end of maternity leave). The award 
does not specifically give a period of preference. 
II 
Its comparable provision is therefore dependent 
upon the interpretation to be placed upon the date 
when the one month's notice of intention to resume 
k · b . 
1117 
d 1 h . f wor is to e given, an a so upon t e meaning o 
"subject to the availability of a position" in clause 
20(b) of the award. (The Court held that the award 
is to be read as meaning that one month's notice 
must be given either before the maternity leave 
expires or within a reasonable time thereafter). 
(v) Presumption that position can be kept open - the 
Act provides such a provision in section 16. The 
award contains no such provision but its comparable 
provision depends upon the interpretation of clause 
20 (b) "subject to availability of a position." 
] 
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The Court found that the award was clearly much better on 
point (i) and, in light of their interpretation of clause 20(b) 
of the award, they considered that the Act was only slightly 
better on points (iv) and (v) .
18 In overall effect, the 
Court thought that the benefit of the award under point (i) 
outweighed the possible advantages of the Act under points (iv) 
and (v). This was justified by arguing that a knowledgeable adviser 
would recommend an application under the award because nine months' 
leave is better than six months and further that an experienced 
and well regarded employee would get preference as a practical 
matter whether legally entitled to or not.
19 The final justifi-
cation was that the presumption in section 16 was not likely to 
be other than a minor advantage to Mrs Brown having regard to 
her position and to her training and skills. It is unclear 
whether this statement would apply to others in analogous 
situations as the Court must approach each case withua particular 
female employee in mind.
1120 
An extremely important point was made about this analysis 
by the Court in a later stage of the judgement. There it was 
said by the Court, that if their interpretation of clause 20 
was wrong, and in particular if the bank's right to make positions 
available or not was unrestricted and not subject to limited 
review by the Court, it would reverse the result of the assessment 
- and find that the Act is the better package overall.
21 This was 
on the grounds that the right of a female employee to resume work 
if she chooses to do so, is likely to be much more important to her 
than an extra three months' unpaid leave.
22 
In this writer's opinion there is no question that the 
right to resume work is the most important concern to a woman 
taking maternity leave. After all, there is a substantial 
risk in taking maternity leave at all if no job is guaranteed 
afterwards, no matter how much leave is given. Consequently, 
the writer submits that the right to resume work should be the 
foremost consideration in determining whether one package is 
preferable to the package offered under the Act. 
7 • 
Therefore, when applying this Arbitration Court judgment, 
caution must be taken to ensure that the judgment is read in 
its entirety. Otherwise, those who must apply the judgment 
may be misled into adopting the view that the length of leave 
was the decisive factor in the case. This is arguably not so, 
as the Court demonstrated in the later part of the judgment 
(although not clearly) that the right to resume work is likely 
to be the most important consideration in any maternity leave 
case. 
Comment 
As will become clear, the Act sets up a considerable 
number of opportunities for conflict. Section 4 undoubtedly 
provokes conflict right at the beginning when a woman decides 
to take maternity leave. Because the Arbitration Court has 
held that the Act in its entirety will not apply when a woman 
is entitled to rights and benefits provided by a collective 
instrument or individual employment contract which are in their 
overall effect more or as favourable than those in the statute, 
the female employee has to make a decision right from the 
beginning, which to proceed under. 23 
As has been pointed out in an article by Lindsay Rea: 24 
the woman would face a very complicated process of decision 
because neither the awards nor the Act are written in language 
which is easy to understand. 
The next problem raised by section 4 is that in every 
situation an employer can dispute the employee's choice of 
procedure, 25 which means that arbitration or court proceedings 
must be undertaken. This is hardly the ideal situation for a 
pregnant woman wanting maternity leave to have to face. This 
is even more so when it is considered that it took 18 months 
before Mrs Brown finally had the decision from the Arbitration 
Court. The Act certainly does not make maternity leave a 
comfortable time. 26 
] 
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Requirements to be Fulfilled Before Maternity Leave (or leave 
for adoption) will be Granted. 
Sections 5 and 6 deal with entitlement to maternity leave. 
Under section 5 a female employee is entitled to maternity 
leave if she becomes pregnant, and will at the date of the 
expected delivery have been for the immediately preceding 18 
months, in the employment of the same employer for at least 15 
hours a week. Under section 6 a female employee is entitled 
to maternity leave if she assumes (with a view to adoption by 
her or by her and her husband jointly) the care of a child 
who is not more than 5 years of age and will have satisfied the same 
time and continuity requirements as in section 5 at the date 
on which she first assumes the care of the child. (It is 
necessary to look at the Schedule to this Act to determine 
whether a female employee has remained in the employment of the 
same employer during any period of time or whether a female 
employee has resumed service with the same employer). 
It should be noted that most private sector award clauses 
are silent about eligibility for leave in cases of adoption . 
. MichaeJ._ Law suggests however that the wording of these clauses 
may implicitly provide for adoption and says that a test case 
ld b 
. . 27 wou e interesting. 
The main problem with these provisions is the length of 
time that a woman must have been employed by the same employer 
before being entitled to maternity leave. Eighteen months is 
a long time - especially when compared with private and public 
sector awards. A comparison with the private awards studied 
stows that IX) qualifying period of service is required in nearly 
45% of cases 28- the remaining 55% of awards require only 12 
or 6 months' service. Although one award requires 18 months' 
service, and another 3 years' service, both awards afford the 
worker better conditions than sections of the Act~
9 
Public 
sector awards set two qualifying periods of service, however 
this is mainly designed at setting two different periods of 
leave. Hence if an employee has at least one years' service 
] 
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she will be granted leave of up to 12 months. An employee 
with less than a years' service will be only granted up to 
six months' leave. 
If a large number of private sector awards can set no 
period of qualifying service and the remaining public and 
private sector awards can offer leave after a maximum of 12 
months' service, it is unnecessary for the Act to set such a 
high limit. More importantly, it may have the effect of 
denying a significant number of women the initial entitlement 
to protection under the Act, which in the majority of cases 
provides more protection than an award. Further, the 
International Labour Organisation Covenant and other international 
statements unanimously state or imply that maternity leave 
should be available to all working women regardless of service.30 
Another unnecessary feature of this section is a reference 
to the number of hours a week that must have been worked before 
a woman can gain the protection of the Act. Private and public 
sector awards also say nothing about this point. What this 
suggests is that such criteria are yet another unnecessary and 
restrictive addition to an already limited Act. 
Duration and Corrunencement of Maternity Leave 
Under section 8 maternity leave is to be taken in one 
continuous period of 26 weeks. 
Section 9 determjnes that the leave is to begin on either 
the date of confinement, 31 or in the case of adoption on the 
date on which the female employee first assumes the care of the 
child, or on an earlier date as determined in accordance with 
sections 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the Act. 
Section ill gives the woman employee power to begin maternity 
leave at a date which is earlier by not more than 6 weeks than 
the expected date of delivery. This is provided that the woman 
gives the employer not less than 21 days' notice in writing of 
the day on which she wishes her maternity leave to begin. 
] 
] 
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Section 11 gives the female employee and employer power to 
determine the commencement of maternity leave on any date before 
the date of confinement. 
Under section 12, leave will commence early where a medical 
practitioner considers this is necessary. The doctor may give to 
the employee a written certificate specifying the date on which 
in his/her opinion, the employee should begin her maternity leave. 
Section 13 enables the employer to appoint the date of commence-
ment if the woman is unable to perform her work to the :safety of 
herself or others, or is incapable of performing her work adequat-
ely because of pregnancy and further there is no other suitable 
work avail~ble. 
It should be noted that under section 8 (2) the period of leave 
will be extended beyond the 26 week period if the employee commences 
early leave under sections 12 and 13. In these circumstances the 
female employee is entitled to take at least 20 weeks of her 
maternity leave after the expected date of delivery and so if 
necessary extend her maternity leave. 
There are potential problems created by fixing a time when 
leave must commence; particularly as this may mean that a woman 
could end up with an extremely short period between the date of 
confinement and the date on which she must return to work (ie. if 
section 8(2) does not apply). This issue will be of particular 
relevance where the employee or her child is suffering ill-health 
- and hence it can be seen that ct strong need exists in the current 
Act for extension of leave on health grounds. 
It should also be noted that, although most private sector 
awards
32 
limit the leave to six months (nearly 81 %)
33 as with the 
Act, most do not however stipulate when the leave must commence. 
The possibility of dispute may arise where the employer is 
involved in the decision when to take leave. Situations may arise 
where it is uncertain whether both employer and employee decided 
about commencement of leave or whether the employer alone decided
34 . 
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Cases can be envisaged where the employer suggests that the 
female employee should commence leave early because her work 
performance is not adequate, and the employee (reluctantly) 
acquiesces. Is this a situation where it can truly be said that 
the employer and employee have jointly agreed upon the commence-
ment of leave? This issue is of significance because of the 
consequences for the amount of available leave. Only if the 
employer has appointed the date of commencement will an employee 
receive extended leave under section 8 (2), otherwise she will 
be limited to a total period of 26 weeks. 
Notice requirements: 
1. 
2 • 
Under section 14, an application for maternity leave 
must be made in writing at least three months before the 
expected date of delivery. This does not apply in the case 
of adoption where much shorter notice is given by the parent. 
Notice of intention to adopt a child has to be given to the 
employer stating the date on which the woman first intends 
to assume the care of the child. 
This requirement is rather strict in two aspects: 
namely (1) that the application has to be in writing and 
(2) 3 months' notice has to be given. Of the private sector 
awards studied 35 only in three cases was a written 
application required by employees wishing to take leave. 
Further only 16% of awards required any sort of notice -
with the vast majority of these requiring only 1 month's 
notice. It is interesting to note that only one award 
required 3 months' notice. 
Section 15 requires that within 21 days of receiving 
the employee's application for leave the employer must give 
her written reply informing her: 
(a) 
( b) 
( C) 
(d) 
whether or not she is entitled to leave;36 
37 whether or not her position can be kept open; 
where her position cannot be kept open that she 
may dispute the employer's statement; 
that where the position cannot be kept open, the 
employer will give her preference over other 
applicants for any vacant position which is 
] 
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"substantially similar'' during the 26 weeks after 
the leave period ends; 
(e) of her rights concerning the date of commencement 
of leave 38 and her obligation to give her employer 
not less than 21 days written notice of the day on 
which she wishes to begin her maternity leave; 39 
(f) of her rights to end her leave early either with 
her employer's consent or where she suffers a 
miscarriage of her child or her child or the child 
she was to adopt is stillborn or dies, or her 
child is adopted. 40 
There is no mention in the Act of the amount of notice 
that should be given in the event of an early return to 
work. The New Zealand Employers Federation therefore 
recommends that the employer advise the woman in the above 
notice of the amount of notice personally required. They 
suggest that the period of notice should either relate to 
the period of notice required to terminate the employment 
of the temporary replacement (however again no guideline 
for this has been provided by the Act) or 21 days - as this 
is the normal notice requirement under the Act. 
A significant issue raised by section 15 was brought 
to the writer's attention by the New Zealand Employers 
Federation handout - "Maternity Leave and Employment 
Protection Act 1980 - a guide for employers". In that 
handout there is a conspicuous absence of the requirement 
under this section to notify the employee that she may 
dispute the employer's statement that her position cannot 
be kept open. It is clear that the section requires this 
information to be in the notice 41 and accordingly the 
writer submits there should be repercussions for an employer 
who fails to do so - especially in situations where a female 
employee ends up falling prima facie beyond the scope of the 
Act, because she was unaware of her rights. 
This could arise in the following situation: Mrs X 
applies for maternity leave under the Act. In the employer's 
] 
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notice it is stated that Mrs X's job cannot be kept open, 
and the notice is silent as to Mrs X's right to dispute 
the employer's claim. Instead it merely informs her 
about the 26 week preference period. At the end of this 
period, Mrs X has been offered no position which is sub-
stanti~lly similar to her former one and is informed that 
her employment has been terminated. It is then or at 
some later stage that Mrs X finds out that she could have 
contested her employer's statement that her position could 
not be kept open. Mrs X wonders whether she can now take 
proceedings - having already lost her job. 
Under the Act in section 34 a complaint cannot be made 
either: 
(a) after the expiration of 26 weeks from the date on 
which the subject matter of the complaint arose: 
( b) 
or 
before the expiration of 20 weeks from either the 
expected date of delivery or in the case of 
adoption, the date on which the female employee 
(with a view to adoption) first assumed the care 
of the child - whichever is the later. 
Action under section 34 must be brought under one of 
the grounds set out in paragraphs (a) - (d). These cover 
the situations where the employer (a) is not justified 
in stating that the employee's position cannot be kept open; 
(b) has terminated the woman's employment or given her 
notice terminating her employment in con~ravention of 
section 27(1); (c) has taken other action that adversely 
affects her: (d) has exercised, without reasonable 
justification, the power conferred on the employer by 
section 13 or 24 of the Act. 
Prima facie it would be open to the Court simply to 
say that it has no jurisdiction to hear the case because 
th . 1. . . 4 2 f h e time imit set by the Act has expired, and urt er 
that the issue raised does not fall within any of the 
d . . 34 4 3 groun sin section . 
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However, it is submitted that there is a strong possibility 
in a case such as this that the Court will exercise its discretion
 
under section 44 to grant the employee a right to a hearing. 
Section 44 applies to situations where something is "omitted 
to be done or cannot be done at the time required by or under 
[the] Act, or is done before or after that time, or is otherwise 
irregularly done in matter of form ... " The Arbitration Court 
(or a complaint committee) is given power to deal with the 
issue in such manner or on such terms as it "thinks just." 
In this case, an action has not been started within the 
time limit because of a faulty notice. This is arguably the 
kind of case where the Court should exercise its discretion to 
ignore the fact that the set time limit has not been complied 
with. More importantly it is the only way that the Act itself 
can be used to deter employers from not following the procedures 
laid down by the Act. No penalties are otherwise laid down for 
employers who do not follow the system - indeed all the penalties 
are directed at the pregnant employee. 
It must be stressed that the Act places a duty on the 
employer to give the proper notice and so it is submitted that 
this section should be used whenever possible to compel employers 
to follow the prescribed procedure. This is particularly 
because such omissions must occur fairly regularly if the Employer
s 
Federation guide is being followed. 
A final point to note is that an employer could also 
request under section 44 that the Court disregard the non-
compliance with the notice requirement of the Act. However 
because the Court must deal with the issue in terms of what it 
"thinks just", it is submitted that the female employee's 
claim will be considered superior to that of the employer, 
particularly as it is the employee who has suffered the injustices
. 
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Section 17 provides that within 21 days after the 
woman commences her leave the employer must send her a 
written notice stating: 
(i) the date on which the leave will end; and 
(ii) the date of the next working day, being the day 
she will be required to return to work, if her 
job is being held open for her; or 
(iii)the 26 week preference period during which the 
employer will give her preference over other 
applicants for any vacant position which is 
substantially similar, if her job cannot be 
left open for her; and 
(iv)where paragraph (ii) applies, her obligations 
under section 18 of the Act (to be dealt with 
next): and 
(v) her rights under section 19 of the Act (this deals 
with early ending of maternity leave). 
It should be noted that the Employers Federation guide 
has again omitted certain statements which must be made by 
the employer to fulfil the requirements of section 17. These 
are set out in the last two paragraphs and deal with the 
female employee's obligation to give notice under section 18 
and the right of an employee to return to work early in 
certain situations under section 19. 
The absence of both these notice requirements may again 
cause unnecessary disadvantage to the female employee. At 
least however, in the situation where the female employee's 
requirement to give notice is omitted, the employee can argue 
that section 44 should be applied to disregard her non-compliance. 
In the situation where an employee is not told that she could 
have returned to work early and the circumstances set out in 
section 19 arise, it is difficult to see what remedy, if any, 
the employee could get for loss of income, where she has 
remained at home for the entire 26 week period, not knowing 
that she could have returned to work early. In the writer's 
opinion, the female employee should be entitled to 
] 
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some remedy, however there seems to be nothing in the Act 
which will entitle her to one. 
Section 18 states that if the woman's job is being 
held for her she must notify her employer no later than 21 
days before the end of her leave stating whether or not she 
will be returning to work. (Her employment will be con-
sidered to have terminated as from the day her maternity 
leave began, if she tells her employer she will not return 
to the job, or if she fails without good cause, to return 
to work at the end of her maternity leave : section 20). 
It is interesting to note, that of the private sector 
awards not applying the provisions of the Act, nearly 40% 
require that the female employee give some notice of return 
to work. The most common requirements are for : (a) 1 month's 
notice (19 awards); (b) 2 weeks' notice (18 awards), and 
2 months' notice (14 awards). However there are a notable 
number of awards which require notice of return at either 
1 month or 2 months after the birth of the child (12 in total). 
Public sector awards require one months' notice of return to 
work. 
Even though the awards, on the whole, set a longer 
period of notice of return than the Act, it must be considered 
that in the vast majority of awards, this will be the only 
notice that is required by the employee. Further, such 
notice requirements could also be affected by the time limit 
laid down for dismissing a replacement or re-organising staff ... 
5. Under section 19 a female employee may end her maternity 
leave and return to work earlier, or may begin her period 
of preference at an earlier date by giving the employer 
written notice: 
(a) if she suffers a miscarriage or 
(b) if her child is stillborn or dies, or 
{c) if she has consented to the adoption of her 
child and some other person has custody of the 
child with a view to adoption, or 
J 
I 
I 
] 
I 
I 
I 
1 I 
I 
17. 
44 (d) if h e r e mpl o y e r c o nsents . 
The consent of the employer can be made conditional 
on a medical certificate that the employee is fit to resume 
work. 
There is no mention in the Act of the amount of notice 
that should be given in the event of an early return to 
work. Accordingly, the Employers Federation guide recommends 
that the employer advise the woman in the section 15 notice 
of the amount of notice personally required.
45 
Comment 
The Act has laid down five separate occasions for which 
formal, written notice is required. Three of these five notices 
must be given by the woman employee. 
as a 
Alexander Szakats has described these formal notice requirerrents 
"further drawback of the legislation in New Zealand. 1146 
As he says, a woman approaching her time of confinement and 
afterwards being left busy with an infant has enough to worry 
about without the further trouble of remembering the statutory 
' d f . 47 . . . . b perio or notices. In any case, giving written notices may e 
a routine task for an employer but for a woman performing factory 
or shop work before her maternity leave, it can be a difficult job. 
Judith Reid, Secretary of the Auckland and Gisborne Shop 
Employees Union believes that most employees would in any event, 
be totally unaware of the procedures which must be followed to 
obtain maternity leave. She says that : "We do what we can to 
give our delegates and others the necessary information, but we 
II 48 do not have sufficient education resources to do the job properly. 
It follows that in many situations it will only be a claim under 
section 44 which will help an employee who has not complied with 
the many notice requirements. Again this involve s proceedings 
and unnecessary time and stre ss. 
It is submitted that the Act should be brought into line with 
public and private sector awards. According ly, the only notice which 
should be required from the e mployee, is notice of return to work. 
I 1 
I 1 
_I I 
l -I 
I J 
I 1 
r J 
I 
I J 
18. 
In terms of practicality, it is advisable that this notice should 
be given. However, whether it should be written or not is 
arguable, and although it would be preferable to be able to leave 
the employer and employee to work things out orally,a written 
notice could prove valuable as it provides non-rebuttable 
evidence of both partie~ intentions. 
What is Meant by a "Substantially Similar Position" 
In cases under section 15 where it is stated that the 
employee's position cannot be kept open, the employer must give 
the employee preference over other applicants for any position 
which is vacant and which is substantially similar to the position 
held by her at the beginning of her maternity leave. 
There are two potential problems caused by this paragraph. 
The first is the problem of interpreting the term "substantially 
similar" - as no definition has been provided in the statute. 
However this term, and similar terms, are used in some private 
and public awards, and the courts could use these as a guideline 
to determine what is meant. One award defines the term 
"substantially similar"as meaning: 
(i) In the same location or at another location 
within reasonable commuting distance of the 
previous location, and 
(ii) Involving responsibilities and prospects broadly 
comparable to those exercised or enjoyed in the 
. . . 49 previous position. 
Another award says a "similar :oosition" is: 
- at the equivalent salary and grading: and 
- in the same location or other location in reasonable 
commuting distance, and -
- involving responsibilities broadly comparable to those 
. d . h . . . 50 exercise in er previous position. 
The lack of any statutory definition of "substantially similar" 
raises another situation where litigation or a dispute of some 
kind may occur. Such difficulties should not be present in an 
Act which is desig~d to foster the rights of pregnant employees, 
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as it raakes the process long, drawn out and of course, unpleasant. 
Perhaps a greater problem with the paragraph is that it 
gives employers (and particularly those in smaller enterprises) 
a lot of power during the 26 week waiting period to determine 
whether a "substantially similar" position will be offered. Thus 
if a woman on maternity leave was not wanted back in the enterprise, 
the employer could simply neglect to offer a position which is 
substantially similar to the woman's previous one, and therefore 
avoid the need to re-employ the woman. This is a potentially 
dangerous section. It may be up to the Courts therefore to place 
a firm burden of proof on the employer to show that a "substantially 
similar" position was in fact not available. 
In What Circumstances will the Employee's Position be Kept Open 
Section 16 is possibly the most important section in the 
Act. This is because there is a presumption in section 16 for 
the employer to hold a job open for a female employee who goes on 
maternity leave. Thus in every case the employer will have the 
onus of proving that a position cannot be kept open. This will 
be proved where: 
(a) a temporary replacement is not reasonably 
practicable due to the key position occupied 
within the employer's enterprise by the 
female employee, or 
(b) a redundancy situation occurs. 
In determining whether or not a position is a key position, regard 
may be had, among other things, to -
(a) 
( b) 
the size of the employer's enterprise; and 
the training period or skills required in the job. 
Section 16(1)(a) 
In the ANZ case
51
, the judge made some obiter comments about 
Section 16 - and particularly about the meaning of the term 
"key position". These comments are particularly important 
because the Court held that if the employee does not occupy a 
"key position" (and no redundancy situation has occurred) section 
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16 (1) (a) creates an irrebuttable presumption that the position 
will be kept open. 
It is first necessary to outline exactly what the Court 
found was the female employee's position in this case. Mrs 
Brown held the position of securities clerk grade III at a small 
branch of the ANZ bank in Kaitaia. The staff consisted of a 
branch manager, branch accountant, securities clerk and seven 
more junior officers . 
In such a branch although the manager is responsible for 
all the activities of the branch, he is more directly concerned 
with customer relations and with the lending functions of the 
bank. In this latter function therefore his chief assistant is 
the securities clerk. The securities clerk will also undertake 
the accountant's duties within limits - the accountant is the second-
ranking officer of the branch. 
The Court found that, broadly speaking, the securities 
clerk is the third ranking officer of the branch who substitutes 
occasionally for the second ranking officer, and whose primary 
duties are undertaken with direct responsibility to the first 
ranking officer of the branch. 
Judge Williamson started his discussion as to the meaning 
of the words "key position" by considering two possible but 
opposing interpretations. The first of these is that "everyone 
employed by the bank plays some part in completing it or holding 
it together and therefore occupies a key position 11 • 52 The 
second states that "the key positions in a bank are those of its 
leading officers - the general manager, senior assistants to the 
general manager, experts with specialised knowledge such as head 
office divisional heads, area managers and branch managers 11 ~ 3 
The union argued for the second, more restrictive interpreta-
tion, on the grounds that the bank's enterprise as a whole should 
be considered . The bank argued for a less restricted interpretation 
so that each unit of its organisation or activity, such as a branch, 
is the subject of assessment. 54 The Court eventually held in 
favour of the bank's approach . That decision was made on the basis 
that Parliament would not have intended th result under the 
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restrictive interpretation which would have meant in practice 
that every female employee occupying a position junior to that 
of the branch manager would have an absolute right to resume her 
. . f . l 55 position a ter maternity eave . 
The Court then went on to make some very important comments 
about the implications of adopting a less restrictive approach. 
The first of these is that when deciding whether a position is a 
key one or not, regard must be had to section 16 (2) (a) and (b) 
and "other things 11 •
56 
The Court also said that they believed the presumption to 
be irrebuttable in cases where persons with elementary skills 
were employed in large enterprises and therefore did not occupy 
k 
. . 57 
ey positions. 
Finally the Court said that the "test" in determining 
whether a temporary replacement is reasonably practicable or not 
is: 
(i) In small enterprises a person with elementary 
skills might be said to occupy a key position in 
that enterprise and might have to be replaced on 
a permanent basis, and 
(ii) In all enterprises, including larger enterprises 
only a fairly well trained or skilled person might 
be said to occupy a key position and might have 
t b l d b 
. 58. 
o e rep ace on a permanent asis. 
Under these rules the Court found that Mrs Brown did 
occupy a key position in the employer's enterprise. Judge 
Williamson thought she was a skilled person who had received 
a lengthy period of training and that such training period and 
skills were required for her position. 5
9 The Court also made 
the point that even though other persons in the bank in New 
Zealand had similar skills and training they were not of any 
significance because the skills and training were needed by the 
bank in Kaitaia. 
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It should be noted that even if the position is a key one, 
the presumption could still fail to be rebutted if it is 
"reasonably practicable'' to provide a temporary replacement 
(which it was in the case). An indication as the meaning of the 
words "reasonably practicable" is seen in the British case: 
d 'd 60 Porter v Ban ri ge: 
The meaning given to the words ... varies with the 
context in which it is used. At one end of the spectrum 
are cases relating to the statutory duties placed upon 
employers to take steps to protect their employees. There 
the phrase is strictly interpreted. 61 
This additional condition clearly acts to ensure that women 
requiring leave for maternity purposes are not easily dismissed 
and this will be particularly so in large enterprises (such as 
banks). Indeed, Union Officials spoken to 62 indicated that 
employers, when challenged, all agreed to hold the positions of 
their employees open, rather than have to prove that it was not 
reasonably practicable to provide a temporary replacement. Further, 
if the availability of services offering temporary replacements 
continues to expand, the position may arise where it is comparatively 
easy in all enterprises to replace temporarily a woman requiring 
maternity leave. In such a situation it is submitted that it 
should only be in rare circumstances that a woman's position cannot 
be kept open. 
Comment 
The Court's interpretation of section 16(1) (a) and (2) (a) (b) 
raises some interesting issues. 
The first issue concerns the Court's interpretation of the 
term: 
section 
what is 
and (b) 
to have 
"regard may be had, among other things, to - ... ", in 
63 16(2). In the ANZ case, the Court stated that to say 
a key position, regard must be had to section 16(2) (a) 
and "other things 11 • 64 This means that Court cannot fail 
regard to the factors set out in paragraphs (a) and (b). 
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The Employers Federation however, may see the subsection 
as carrying an interpretation different to that given by the 
Court. They state in their maternity leave guide that: "the 
phrase 'among other things' indicates that the employer is not 
precluded from advancing other grounds for the 'key' nature of 
the position." 
It is accepted that this statement is ambiguous and could 
mean nothing more than that the employer is allowed to raise other 
grounds in addition to those in paragraphs (a) and (b). It is 
feasible however, that the Employers Federation interprets the 
subsection as meaning that it is possible merely to raise "other 
grounds" to show that a position is a key one. This interpretation 
is clearly a valid one as the wording is that regard may (rather 
than must) be had, among other things, to the factors set out in 
paragraphs (a) and (b). 
The second issue concerns the overall effect of the Court's 
interpretation of the term "key position." It is submitted that 
Judge Williamson's statements (and particularly the "test" he lays 
down), have the effect of providing an immediate rebuttal of the 
prima facie presumption that the employee's position can be kept 
open for: women in any small enterprise (note: no indication is 
given as to what constitutes a small enterprise); professional 
women in all enterprises, and finally; any women who have under-
gone a fair amount of training - arguably this could apply to any 
bank teller, data input worker or even a machinist in some situations • 
Indeed in many cases, unless a woman works for an enterprise 
in which it is "reasonably practicable" to provide a temporary 
replacement, she will only have a fragile chance that her position 
must be kept open. It is this writer's contention therefore, that 
the Court's interpretation is much too wide and arguably is not 
within the intention of Parliament as is said by the Court. Its 
effect is to exclude those women who are most likely to want to 
return to work (i.e. those with skills or training) - leaving 
protection only for those persons with elementary skills who are 
_· ,-- .. ,-. .. ..  
I 
24. 
employed in large enterprises, as the Court itself says. 65 It 
should be noted that this group typically has a high turnover and 
consists mainly of women who are not yet at child-bearing age, or 
older women whose children are old enough to look after themselves. 66 
It is interesting to consider that section S(j) of the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1924 is used by the Court to arrive at its 
narrow interpretation of the term "key position." This section 
requires that an Act is given "such fair, large, and liberal 
construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment 
of the object of the Act." The Court's reference to the section 
is clearly appropriate, however it is this writer's submission 
that the Court has used it in a way that does not accord with 
the object of the Act. The Act is described in the title as one 
aimed to : (1) "prescribe minimum requirements with respect to 
maternity leave" and (2) "protect the rights of female employees 
during both pregnancy and maternity leave." Thus it is only in 
respect of such requirements as length of leave, amount of service, 
and availability of payment that the Act sets a minimum. For the 
protection of the rights of employees during both pregnancy and 
maternity leave, no minimum standard is required. 
Accordingly, it is evident that the Act is meant to protect 
the rights of all women requiring maternity leave (except of 
course those who are protected by "better" awards or agreements), 
not just those lucky enough to be in sufficiently unskilled jobs 
in large enterprises. It is therefore submitted that the Court's 
interpretation of the term "key position'' should not be adopted 
by future courts in its entirety. The obiter statements made by 
Judge Williamson need to be modified so that many more women 
employees fit within the presumption laid down in section 16. 
Section 16(1) (b) 
As stated previously, a woman's employment can be terminated 
if the employer proves that a redundancy situation has occured. 
A maternity leave case recently decided by the Public Services 
T 'b 1 67 'd f . . ri una provi es some use ul guidelines as to how a redundancy 
case will be dealt with. 
In the case, the employee commenced approved maternity leave 
from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in January, 1982. 
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She had been employed there for about 10 years as a typist, and 
and of the three typists in the Department, she was second in 
seniority. On 16 July 1982 the Ministry advised that the position 
had been disestablished and hence there was no longer a position 
available for her. Eventually the case came before the Tribunal . 
The Tribunal held that if there is a component which affects 
maternity leave in the establishment or disestablishment of posi-
tions, the Tribunal could look at that. The Tribunal analysed 
the facts,and the policy of the Ministry,and found that even if 
the Ministry had only needed two typists, had all three been 
working at the time of the action, either all three would have 
been kept on until a vacancy occurred naturally, or alternatively 
one position would have been treated as ''over-scale" and one 
employee would have been relocated or redeployed. The Tribunal 
found that it was unlikely that one would be dismissed on the 
grounds of redundancy. 
Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the decision came at the 
time when it did because of the opportunity afforded by the 
employee's maternity leave. They said that a position temporarily 
unoccupied because the holder is on maternity leave is protected 
(though not absolutely) and that the Ministry's decision had had 
the effect of partially denying the woman employee her rights. 
The woman (having already been given a position in another 
Department) received back-pay of $6,000. 
The significance of this decision is that it shows that the 
courts will look very closely at all the relevant facts and 
circumstances to decide whether a redundancy situation has 
really occurred. It is clear that the decision to make an employee 
redundant whilst she is on maternity leave will be treated with 
some caution and suspicion. This approach recommends itself to 
the writer as it ensures greater protection for the employee on 
maternity leave. 
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A eomparison of Section 16 with Award Brovisions 
Unless an employer can be persuaded that it is reasonably 
practicable to provide a temporary replacement for a woman 
requiring maternity leave under section 16 (1) (a), the woman 
only has a fragile chance that there is a presumption that her 
position can be kept open. 
Public sector awards are clearly superior to the Act in 
this respect. For example, the PSA award states that "as 
a general rule, departments are required to hold open the position 
occupied by a woman on maternity leave or to fill it on a temporary 
basis". The Health Service Personnel Commission award states 
that: "Subject to subclause (5) ... , an employee returning from 
maternity leave is entitled to resume work in the same position 
or in a similar position ... ". 
Private sector awards however generally provide less protection 
than the Act. Michael Law
68 has found that 67 % of clauses 
effectively set the terms of re-engagement rather than provide 
maternity leave as such. Commonly used clauses simply read: 
Where a female employee has ceased employment for maternity 
purposes and is re-employed ... , or 
Provided the employer has a position available the worker 
shall be re-employed ...• 
Law's researchers also found that re-employment was "probable" in 
53.3% of cases and only "possible" in the remainder.
69 This 
indicates that a large number of employers do not believe that 
women taking leave for maternity purposes should have a right to 
return to work. It is clearly arguable that this attitude has to 
some extent influenced those drafting and interpreting the Act. 
Acceptance of Employment Where the Position Has Not Been Held Open 
Section 21 applies in situations where the employer is unable 
to hold open the woman's position for the 26 weeks of leave, and 
must instead, give her preference of employment for any substantially 
similar job that becomes vacant during the 26 weeks after her 
.maternity leave ends. Under this section, the employee has 7 days 
from the date set by the employer to take up any position offered 
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to her - and this can be set at any time during the 26 week 
period after her maternity leave ends. If the woman fails 
without reasonable excuse to take up the position, her employment 
will be deemed to be at an end from the day on which her maternity 
leave began. 
This section may result in obvious unfairness to a female 
employee. For a start, it is extremely anomalous that the 
employee must give three months' written notice to the employer 
of her intention to take maternity leave (which gives the employer 
ample time to arrange for a temporary replacement etc) yet the 
employee only gets seven days' notice (this does not even have 
to be written), in which she must actually decide whether she can 
afford or even wants to return to work, end a temporary job if 
she had one, organise childcare, and organise all the myriad other 
things that a woman with a young baby must do, or else she loses 
her job. 70 It is very difficult to see any justification for 
such a section, especially as the employee receives no remuneration 
at any stage during maternity leave. 
A possible defence that could be raised by a woman who rejects 
the preferential employment, is that the position offered is not 
"substantially similar'' to the position held at the beginning of 
leave. Rejection of the position would therefore be justified.
71 
However it is likely that this defence will only be available in 
a few cases. 
The Position of a Temporary Replacement 
Section 26 deals with the situation where a temporary worker 
is engaged to replace a female employee on maternity leave. The 
section requires that the replacement must be told in writing 
before commencing the job that s/he has been hired on a temporary 
basis to replace a woman on maternity leave and further that the 
employee on leave may return earlier than the date required. 
r 
" 
-
... 
I 
I 
r 
f 
28. 
As Alexander Szakats has pointed out, the purpose of this 
provision is to negative any possible claim for wrongful or 
72 unjustified dismissal by the temporary worker. Further it is 
interesting to note that the Act provides no period of notice 
before such a dismissal, hence it is arguable that the worker 
could be dismissed at short notice, or without any notice at all.
73 
This is hardly a desirable situation. 
An~lysis of Provisions Protecting an Employ~e from Dismissal. 
Under section 27, an employer is unable to dismiss a female 
employee either during her time off on maternity leave, or during 
the preference period following the leave, for any of the following 
reasons: 
(i) because she was pregnant; 
(ii) for health reasons, unless her health is materially 
affected by causes unrelated to pregnancy; 
( iii) 
(iv) 
because she applied for maternity leave; 
because she assumed the care of a child she or she 
and her husband jointly, intended to adopt. 
It should be noted that dismissal for a substantial reason not 
related to the employee's pregnancy, adoption, or her rights 
under the Act, nevertheless remains within the employer's rights. 74 
Problems may arise under this section in cases where it is 
arguable that the employee actually was dismissed because of her 
pregnancy, or because of her health during pregnancy, but the 
employer says the dismissal was due to other reasons. This problem 
was dealt with in an English case75 where the Court had to deter-
mine whether the woman was dismissed primarily because of her 
pregnancy, or whether in fact the dismissal was due to her absence 
for substantial periods due to health problems. Briefly the facts 
were as follows: The employee, d keypunch operator, was absent 
for health reasons for considerable periods in 1977 and 1978. 
Her absences disrupted the work of the department and on February 
13, 1979, she was given a written warning that failure to improve 
her attendance record would lead the employers to consider her 
suitability as an employee. The employee was absent between 
March 30 and April 13, a medical certificate showed that she was 
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suffering from gastro-enteritis. On April 10 the employee's 
superior asked the employers to consider dismissing her. On April 
11 the employee telephoned the employers to say that she was 
pregnant. On April 17 the employee was dismissed, and on a domestic 
appeal, that decision was confirmed. The employee complained to an 
industrial tribunal on the grounds of unfair dismissal, and it was 
found that the principal reason for her dismissal was pregnancy. 
This decision was appealed. 
The Employment Appeal Tribunal held in favour of the 
This was primarily because they were of the view that the 
had made a decision to dismiss the employee before it was 
employers. 
employers 
known 
that she pregnant. 
76 
They held that: was 
It does not seem to us that the mere fact they they 
subsequently knew that this employee was pregnant, yet 
went ahead with an earlier decision to dismiss beca use 
of gastro-enteritis, can possibly be sufficient to show 
77 that she had been dismissed by reason of her pregnancy. 
Therefore before there can be a finding that an employer had 
dismissed an employee because she was pregnant, it is essential to 
show that the employer knew or believed that the employee was 
pregnant. 78 
This decision illustrates the potential difficulty a female 
employee could face in situations where pregnancy and dismissal 
occur at around about the same time. It appears that unless the 
employee can clearly prove that the decision to dismiss was taken 
at or after notice of her pregnancy, she will not be able to show 
that her dismissal was for this reason. 
However situations may well arise where the employer has merely 
discussed the idea of dismissal (as arguably occurred in the case) 
and then gives actual notice of dismissal after the employee says 
that she is pregnant. It is submitted that there is a case for 
arguing that dismissal is indeed on the grounds of pregnancy, as 
the final decision to dismiss is not taken until after the fact of 
pregnancy becomes known to the employer. This issue is however one 
that ultimately only the Courts can decide . 
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Under section 27(1) (b), the employer cannot terminate the 
employment during the woman's absence on maternity leave or during 
the 26 weeks beginning with the day her maternity leave ends. 
It should be noted that this paragraph is subject to the 
defences set out in sections 29 and 30. The effect of these 
defences on the efficacy and merit of section 27 will be dealt with 
later. 
It is subsection (2) of section 27 that may cause the greatest 
problems in maternity leave situations. This subsection provides 
that subsection (1) will not be contravened if the employer 
terminates the woman's employment~ 
(a) 
(b) 
with her consent; or 
where solely on account of her pregnancy or of her assuming 
with a view to adoption, the care of a child, she absents 
herself from work more than 6 weeks before the expected 
date of delivery or in the case of adoption, the date 
applicable under section 9(b) of the Act. 
Before going on to consider the potential difficulties that 
may arise under this subsection it is relevant to note that under 
section 25 a pregnant employee is entitled to take a total of up 
to 10 days' special leave for reasons connected with her pregnancy. 
This leave is without pay and must be taken be~ore the maternity 
leave. Therefore when considering the following fact situations 
which may give rise to dispute, it must be assumed that the woman 
has already used up her 10 days of special leave. 
Fact Situation One: 
The employee is having a number of problems with her pregnancy 
and so is put into hospital for observation for three weeks. This 
occurs at some stage prior to the six weeks before confinement. 
Does the employee thereby satisfy the ground of absenting herself 
from work more than six weeks before the expected date of delivery, 
solely on account of her pregnancy? She may well do on a strict 
interpretation of the Act, as the Act does not indicate whether 
the absence must directly precede and continue on into the six week 
period, or whether absence at any time will constitute grounds for 
dismissal. Thus the woman could return to work for some time, and 
still have her employment legally terminated. 
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Fact Situation Two: 
The woman has a false alarm and is admitted to hospital 
more than 6 weeks before the expected date of delivery. She 
is discharged a few days later but does not return to work as 
the 6 week period has come into operation. Again this is a 
situation where it is arguable that the woman's actions will 
enable the employer to terminate her employment under section 
27. 
It is clearly undesirable that women employees can be 
dismissed in the above (and analogous) situations. However this 
could be avoided by classifying the woman's period of absence 
as one taken for health grounds. Such a classification falls 
beyond the words of the section, which allow dismissal only if the 
employee absents herself "solely on account of her pregnancy". 
Another solution would be to make specific provision in the Act 
for situations of this kind. 
Disputes - the Burden of Proof 
Section 28 deals with the burden of proof in any dispute 
situation. It evenly divides the burden between the employee 
and the employer. Firstly, the employee must prove that 
employment was terminated during maternity leave or during the 
26 weeks after the end of the leave. Where the dismissal 
occurred during either of these periods the employer may prove 
special defences (in sections 29/30). 
The Employer's Defences in the Event of Early Dismissal 
Under section 29 where dismissal is proved to have taken 
place during maternity leave it will be a defence if the employer 
proves: 
(a) that s/he was unable to keep the position open because 
(i) the position was a key one, and a temporary 
replacement was not reasonably practicable, or 
(ii) a redundancy situation has occurred; and 
(b) that due to a redundancy situation no substantially 
similar position was available,and 
( C) that the employee's seniority or superannuation rights 
were not prejudicially affected. 
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32. 
It is to be noted that in a redurrlancy situation the three factors 
in paragraphs (a) (ii); (b) and (c) must be present. 
79 
shown by use of the connecting word "and". 
This is 
In case of dismissal during the 26 weeks period beginning 
with the day after the end of leave the employer similarly has 
to prove the matters (b) and (c) above, together with the fact 
that there was no possibility to appoint the employee to a vacant 
position substantially similar to that held by her at the 
80 
beginning of the leave. 
The Arbitration Court will inquire fully into the matter, 
and will hear the parties and consider representations. It should 
be noted that the decision of the Court will be a final settlement 
. 81 
on the parties. 
The problem with both these sections is that it enables the 
employer to dismiss the female employee in effect at any time after 
the child has been born (or adopted) - if any of the above factors 
can be proven. The Act however is supposed to secure 26 weeks of 
maternity leave and if no job is available a following 26 weeks 
of leave before employment can be terminated. 
Thus the reality appears to be that an employee can be 
dismissed in even the first week or month of her maternity leave 
(or 26 weeks additional leave) on the grounds that a redundancy 
situation has occurred. Because the Act says nothing about the 
redundancy situation having to be current at the time when the 
employee is due to return to work, it is unlikely that the employee 
could argue that the dismissal was invalid on the grounds that no 
redundancy situation was present at the time when she was due to 
return. Thus it can be seen that the employee's protection whilst 
on leave is very fragile indeed. 
Effectiveness of the Complaints Provisions 
Under Section 34, an employee may make a "maternity leave complaint" 
and have it resolved through a formal complaint procedure if it falls 
within the following categories: 
(a) the woman alleges the employer is not justified in 
82 
saying her position cannot be held open for her. 
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(b) 
( C) 
(d) 
33. 
The woman alleges that her employer has dismissed 
her, or given her notice of dismissal either before 
or after the delivery or adoption, for any of the 
reasons given in Section 27. 
The woman claims the employer has taken some action 
which adversely affects her maternity leave rights 
and benefits; 
The woman submits the employer has been unreasonable 
in using the right to either direct her to leave work 
83 early or to transfer her to another job before she 
. l 84 takes maternity eave. 
A complaint procedure must be commenced within 26 weeks after 
the cause of it arose or within 20 weeks before the expected date 
of delivery, whichever is the later. 
Section 34 appears to give rise to a number of interpretation 
and practical problems. 
The first problem is that the Act provides no definition as to what 
constitutes "the subject-matter of the complaint." This is clearly 
vital information as the Act has prescribed a strict time limit 
within which a complaint must be brought. The starting date therefore, 
is of great significance. 
Examples of the date on which the subject-matter of the 
complaint may be argued to arise include: the date when the 
employer makes an oral statement that the employee's position cannot 
be kept open because the woman occupies a key position; the date 
when the employee receives a formal notice as required under section 
15 that her job cannot be kept open; or the date on which the 
employee without notice discovers that she could have disputed the 
employer's statement that her job could not be kept open. Ultimately 
this matter must be settled by the courts or Parliament. 
A second, related problem is that the time limit within which 
an action must be brought under the section is a comparatively short 
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34. 
one - especially in •situations where the employee may be confused 
about her status (i.e. whether she is dismissed or not), or unsure 
about her rights of challenging the employer's assertion. It is 
hoped that where the employee fails to bring an action within the 
prescribed time limits because of such factors, the courts will 
exercise their discretion under section 44 to overcome the non-
compliance. The courts could also interpret the words "date on 
which the subject-matter of the complaint arose" so that they are 
broad enough to include the latest possible date upon which the 
cause of action can be said to have arisen. 
The final problem is that the process through the complaint 
proceedings is likely to be lengthy and wearying. The ANZ case 
provides a good example of this point. For example, Mrs Brown 
was told in June that she could take maternity leave but could not 
have her job - but it took two months for her employer to reply to 
the union's correspondence, and it was not until November that the 
union could get a date for the first part of the hearing. The 
complaint was referred to the Arbitration Court in December, and it 
took six months to get a hearing date. Finally, when the Court 
heard the decision in May it did not reach a decision until October, 
meaning that the whole process took a total of 18 months to get 
85 through. The trouble hardly seems worth it. 
Prospect of Remuneration 
Under section 7 an employer is not obliged to pay remuneration 
at any stage to an employee taking maternity leave, or the 26 weeks' 
preference leave. 
The lack of any remuneration has been seen as one of the major 
86 
defects of the New Zealand Act. Indeed, Alexander Szakats contends 
that the greatest weakness of the New Zealand law lies in the "complete 
lack of providing any monetary benefits for the working mother 
either in form of a Social Welfare payment or continuation of 
1187 h . . l"k wages. Furt er, it is uni ely that the woman could apply for 
an unemployment benefit during maternity leave - and this is 
expecially if she has a working husband. 88 Thus some families 
will suffer unnecessary financial hardship whilst the working 
mother is on leave. 
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A comparison of the Act with awards shows that all public 
sector awards provide for some payment to cover part of maternity 
leave. Employees represented by the PSA for example will get an 
equivalent of 30 working days' leave on pay if they complete a 
further six months' service at the expiration of maternity leave. 
In the private sector, a total of 21 awards provide for some 
kind of remuneration. These include 12 hospital documents which, 
like the Public Service, provide a lump sum of 30 days' pay after 
' 
six months' work. Two awards contain provisions for one days pay 
for every one month's service; one up to a maximum of 60 days, 
the other to a maximum of 90 days. In addition at least 6 other 
documents allow paid leave which is debited against a worker's sick 
leave entitlement. Half of these however require at least six 
months' subsequent service before payment can be claimed.
89 
It is submitted that remuneration for employees on maternity 
leave is one of the most urgent changes required to be made to the 
existing Act. Already a substantial number of employees are 
entitled to some kind of payment under their awards, and thus it 
seems inequitable that the statute which is intended to prescribe 
minimum requirements with respect to maternity leave, can be 
allowed to provide for no payment at all. However, it must be 
left to Parliament to rectify this. 
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36. 
CONCLUS~ON 
The task of this paper has been to determine whether the 
Maternity Leave and Employment Protection Act 1980 effectively 
protects the rights of women requiring maternity leave. 
Accordingly, the paper has identified interpretation, policy and 
operational issues raised in both the Act itself and the ANZ case, 
which indicate whether adequate protection is indeed guaranteed. 
A brief discussion of these issues will be undertaken by the 
writer, as they provide valuable guidelines in determining 
the Act should be retained in its current form - or rather, 
drafted afresh. 
A number of significant interpretation issues have been 
identified.For example, it has been revealed that the Act contains 
several unclear terms, including "substantially similar
1191 and 
"the date on which the subject-matter of the complaint arose 11.
92 
90 
The presence of such terms has the effect of confusing the 
employee's position, and also increases the necessity for statuto ry 
or judicial intervention - should a dispute occur. Such problems 
could clearly be avoided by providing guidelines as to the 
construction of these terms in the Act's Interpretation section. 
Other interpretation issues have been raised by the statements 
of Judge Williamson in the ANZ case.
93 The first of these arises 
out of his discussion of the factors which determine whether the 
Act or a collective agreement should apply under section 4. 
Thus, it has been noted that future courts will have to ensure 
that the judgment is read in its entirety, so that the Judge's 
later comments about the right to return to work being the most 
important consideration, are reflected. The second issue concerns 
Judge Williamson's narrow interpretation of the term "key position" 
- which has the effect of prima facie removing protection for those 
women who are most likely to want to return to work. It has been 
submitted in the paper that the Judge's interpretation is in fact 
contrary to the object of the Act, and hence should be amended. 
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37. 
Important policy issues have also been identified in the 
paper. For example, it has been noted that the Employers 
Federation handout on the Act does not advise employers of a 
number of important factors which must be included in the 
statutory notices. The absence of these factors has been shown 
to undermine and even damage the rights of the female employee. 
It has been observed however, that section 44 of the Act can be 
used by the courts in many cases, to both safeguard the rights 
of the employee and also sanction the employer. Nevertheless 
in the case where an employee is not advised that she can return 
to work early, there appears to be nothing in the Act which will 
either compensate her for any loss of income suffered, or punish 
the employer. Accordingly, it is submitted by the writer that the 
Act should provide sanctions against employersin such situations, 
if the notice requirements are to be retained. 
Another policy issue raised in the paper concerns the lack of 
provision of any special leave for women 94 suffering health 
problems connected with pregnancy. Provision for such leave 
has been shown to be necessary : firstly to prolong the amount of 
leave actually available under sections 10-13; and secondly to 
prevent dismissal on the grounds that the employee has absented 
herself from work "solely on account of her pregnancy" under section 
27(2)(b). 
One of the most important policy issues discussed concerns the 
ineffectiveness of the Act to secure either the initial 26 weeks' 
maternity leave, or the 26 weeks'preference leave, because of the 
statutory defences to dismissal set out in sections 29 and 30. 
This state of affairs does not comport sufficiently with the 
object of the Act as expressed in the title, and hence sections 
29 and 30 should at least be amended, if not repealed. 
Yet another issue of some importance is centred on the lack 
of provision for remuneration under the Act. The paper has revealed 
that this is perceived as one of the major defects of the present 
Act, especially as all public sector and a number of private sector 
awards make some provision for payment. 
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A significant number of operational issues have been raised 
in the paper. For example, the fact that the woman employee is 
required to fulfil lengthy and strict time limits before she 
"qualifies" for maternity leave under the Act,may have the effect 
of pushing a significant number of women beyond the scope of the 
Act's protection. As has been demonstrated in the paper there 
are no such equivalents in either private or public sector awards 
and hence they appear to be unnecessary. Further even if the 
woman does"qualify" she will not have an absolute right to choose 
which maternity leave instrument she will proceed under. This 
means that the opportunity of dispute could arise every time a woman 
applies for maternity leave. 
The Act provides for five written notices to be given, and 
this requirement has been identified as one of the major operational 
defects. A comparison with public and private sector awards shows 
that only one notice is required, and this is the employee's 
notice of her (wish to) return to work. Accordingly it is submitted 
that the other notice provisions should be repealed. 
The lack of provision for a period of notice, before a 
temporary replacement can be dismissed has also been identified 
as an important operational issue raised by the Act. It has been 
shown that the Act should prescribe some notice requirement so 
that the replacement cannot be summarily dismissed. Similarly, 
section 21 should be altered so that a woman whose position has 
not been kept open receives substantially more notice than the 
seven days currently provided by the Act. 
The above discussion of the various issues raised by the Act, 
has revealed that the Act is deficient in a significant number 
or respects. Althouqh there are a number of positive aspects which 
to some extent mitigate the obvious balance of the Act against 
the employee
95
, it is submitted that these are not sufficient to 
warrant the retention of the Act. Accordingly the writer submits 
that the current Act should be repealed and substantionally over-
hauled. 
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Any new statute should be drafted so that it clearly balances 
in favour of the woman employee - particularly as it is her rights 
that are supposed to be protected. Any new statute should also 
be drafted to avoid the issues and problems raised under the 
present Act. The writer accordingly submits that a redrafted statute 
should include~the provision of some remuneration to women during 
leave; the removal of unnecessary interpretation problems; the 
clear indication that all women requiring leave should have a 
prima facie right to return to their position; the deletion of the 
many unnecessary notice and qualification requirements; the 
improvement of dispute procedures;and finally the extension of 
the Act to both parents. 
Urgent reform of the Maternity Leave and Employment Protection 
Act 1980 is clearly required - as it is only through reform that 
the rights of women requiring maternity leave will be effectively 
protected. 
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Appendix One 
A detailed knowledge of provisions in private and public 
sector awards was necessary so that a critical examination of 
the Act could be undertaken. Accordingly the writer studied: 
(a) the 1982 New Zealand Awards (published and issued 
by the Department of Labour) and~ 
(b) public sector awards for: PSA members, Department 
of Education staff, Health Service Personnel 
Commission members . 
The writer first £Orted the awards into groups according to 
their similarity. Then the writer analysed the awards in more 
depth, determining such factors as: length of service; length 
of leave given; prospects of re-employment; provisions for 
payment; service entitlements; notice requirements; and the 
application of the Act. Percentages were then worked out. 
It should be noted that the figures cited in the paper are 
those attained through the writer's study. The writer acknowledges 
that unavoidably some awards may have been missed. It is submitted 
however that this will not alter the validity of the findings as 
providing a basic guideline as to the types and predominance of 
provisions in awards. 
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